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Joy within tranquility
Amazonian Urarina styles of happiness 
Harry Walker, London School of Economics 
and Political Science
Enjoyment in life among Amazonian Urarina is examined through the lens of two 
contrastive concepts of happiness. The first, “tranquility,” is a relatively long-term, relational 
condition implying emotional spontaneity and a flexible, freely chosen work routine that 
allows for a merging of action and awareness. It epitomizes a broader concern with the 
development of an individual “style of life,” where attitudes, manners, and actions come 
into alignment. The second concept, “joy,” is a fleeting state of excitement and anticipation, 
epitomized by the prospect of sharing a meal. While the two concepts imply a distinction 
between the sensuous and the moral, or pleasure and the good life—loosely analogous to 
the classic distinction between hedonia and eudaimonia—it is argued that the experience 
of joy in its purest form effectively crystallizes and intensifies many of the ingredients that 
make up tranquility, thus resolving the tension by suggesting the possibility of harmony 
between sensory enjoyment and virtuous living. 
Keywords: tranquility, happiness, style of life, individuality, nonalienated labor, Amazonia
I’m living peacefully now. Nothing happens. . . . We’re all living peacefully 
because I have my sons to whom nothing happens because I’m with my 
husband. Even when he’s drunk, he doesn’t do anything to me, that’s why 
I’m peaceful. .  .  . I’m living contentedly. He works properly, this man, 
I prepare my manioc beer for him, and he invites his neighbors, I also 
invite my female companions. So I’m working peacefully. 
Rosa held my gaze as she answered my questions about her new life as a married 
woman. She went on to emphasize how difficult it was when her husband traveled 
far away, leaving her alone with the children, but how she would wait patiently for 
him until his return. She told me how her husband’s peaceful life now contrasted 
dramatically with the ongoing problems he had with his previous wife. The term 
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she used over and over again, raotojoeein, meaning loosely “being calm” or “be-
ing tranquil,” is one I often heard used by my Urarina companions when speaking 
about fond memories of times past, but also when invoking the ideal style of life 
they sought to bring about for themselves and their loved ones, and was closely 
linked to ideas of satisfying forms of work. As one man put it succinctly when I 
inquired about his hopes and dreams for the future: “I hope to live peacefully.” A 
straightforward aim, I thought at the time, if somewhat unexciting. Only much 
later did I realize just how sophisticated was this ideal of tranquility, and how it 
brought into alignment a constellation of ideas ranging from truth and right to 
sensory pleasure, freedom from anxiety, moral conduct, and the opportunity to 
pursue one’s own good in one’s own way. 
The Urarina, a group of around four thousand hunter-horticulturalists who in-
habit the Chambira river and its tributaries in the Peruvian Amazon, are not alone 
in their preoccupation with “the good life.” Anthropologists of Amazonia have rou-
tinely been invoking this and related concepts since well before the recent surge 
of interest in Western popular discourse—largely, I think, because it is so clearly a 
central concern of native Amazonian peoples themselves. Philippe Descola (1996), 
in his meticulous study of the Jivaroan economy and its embeddedness within the 
social and cosmological order, was able to show how it was the distinctive Jivaroan 
conception of “the good life,” with its emphasis on marital harmony, the provision 
of ample home-made manioc beer and the like, that effectively prevented the inten-
sification of agriculture where ecological conditions would otherwise have allowed 
for it, thus keeping production in a condition of homeostasis. Descola’s argument 
ran directly counter to the materialist and ecological determinist theses of the time, 
which emphasized the so-called “limiting factors” of soil quality, protein scarcity, 
and so on, while in some ways anticipating the belated “discovery” by some West-
ern economists that maximizing happiness may be a more worthwhile goal than 
increasing material wealth, and that the two do not always coincide. In a different 
vein, Joanna Overing (e.g., 1989) pioneered the study of what she termed the “art 
of living” or the “aesthetics of everyday life,” showing how the Western distinction 
between ethics and aesthetics is irrelevant in a world where people strive for beauty 
in their social relations with others. In various ways, concepts of “the good life” or 
“living well” have since pervaded a large number of anthropological accounts of 
Amazonian sociality (e.g., Overing and Passes 2000a; Belaunde 2001), which often 
emphasize the ways in which Amazonian social life focuses on emotional comfort 
and the maintenance of good or harmonious interpersonal relationships, some of 
which may even extend beyond the human sphere to embrace nonhumans in an 
expansive social order. This is not to say, however, that violence, hostility, conflict, 
and danger are absent from Amazonian life; on the contrary, they are ever-present, 
and indeed they comprise the sociocosmic backdrop against which the ideals of 
peaceable everyday sociality must inevitably be understood (Overing and Passes 
2000b: 6–7). Moreover, as Fernando Santos Granero (2000) has argued, though 
peaceful conviviality is more than an unrealizable ideal, its achievement in practice 
is nevertheless constantly undermined, precisely because it entails such strong feel-
ings of love, trust, and generosity: any rupture in such relations quickly generates 
equally intense negative emotions, such as anger, hatred, or shame, which end up 
driving people apart. 
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Despite this long-standing interest in the conditions of the good life, or the 
“criteria of good living,” to use Descola’s expression, there has been relatively little 
exploration of what it actually feels like to lead a good or virtuous life, or how this 
correlates with happiness as a positive affective state: the relationship, we might 
say, between morality and pleasure. While Amazonians clearly enjoy and hold in 
very high esteem the sensory pleasures associated with food, sex, and meaning-
ful, sociable work, among other things, exactly how short-term, apparently subjec-
tive forms of enjoyment relate to broader conceptions of the good (e.g., Robbins 
2013), and longer-term goals or aspirations in life, remains an open question. It 
has been suggested that ideals of happiness and wellbeing may be closely linked 
to health and productivity (Izquierdo 2009), as well as social relations and success 
in common subsistence activities (Reyes-Garcia and Tsimane’ Amazonian Panel 
Study [TAPS] 2012). According to one study, among the Bolivian Tsimane (ibid.), 
the most frequently mentioned reason for happiness was, significantly, “nothing 
bad happened.” Yet, despite widespread recognition among scholars of the general 
importance of “peacefulness” or “tranquility” in everyday sociality, precisely what 
this means, in moral or affective terms, has scarcely been investigated.
According to Durkheim, for whom the relationship between the moral and the 
sensuous was in many ways a key concern, socialization entailed an emancipation 
from sensory pleasures through the acquisition of a shared moral sensitivity, com-
prising common rules of conduct directed at a higher end which he equated to the 
good. Such a conception, which Durkheim drew from Kant, thus seeks sharply to 
distinguish morality from happiness (or pleasure) and provide a firm grounding 
for the former. The framing of morality in terms of the obligations incumbent upon 
people, however, appears ill suited to the Amazonian context, where rule following 
is not a salient feature of moral life, and where scholars have found greater mile-
age in approaches drawn from virtue ethics, which emphasize the cultivation of 
moral character rather than doing one’s duty or bringing about good consequences. 
On the other hand, Durkheim also acknowledged a possible connection between 
the sensuous and the moral in his notion of collective effervescence, as a kind of 
exaltation that reaffirms social bonds and imbues shared moral values with pow-
erful affective meanings, thereby enhancing their salience in everyday life. Such a 
conception suggests that certain moral dispositions or sensibilities may be rein-
forced precisely in liminal, transitory moments of shared jubilation; and indeed 
later scholars—most notably Victor Turner (e.g., 1969)—have shown that liminal 
or liminoid moments may play a crucial role in orienting people to others. 
In engaging with these issues, we are soon confronted with a great rift that has 
run through Western thinking about happiness from ancient times to the pres-
ent day. Much work in the recent “economics of happiness” movement follows a 
broadly utilitarian approach whose purest form may be found in Jeremy Bentham’s 
assertion that maximizing the sum total of happiness in society should be every-
one’s goal, and the explicit aim of governmental policy. In this view, happiness is 
conceived as a positive affective state, or simply “feeling good,” and often associated 
with a subjective sense of satisfaction with life. An alternative approach follows 
Aristotle’s conception of happiness as a life of virtue, emphasizing ideas of purpose 
and self-actualization, while stressing that the goals of life are diverse and not al-
ways dependent on subjective experience (see, e.g., Ryan and Deci 2001; Tomer 
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2011; Henderson and Knight 2012: 196). Adherents of the latter approach point 
out that the conception of happiness as a subjective feeling is a recent development, 
and that the ancient philosophers who saw happiness as the goal of life were talk-
ing about a far broader conception of human flourishing, one which has a certain 
objective content to it and involves a strong moral or evaluative component. This 
ongoing debate is sometimes referred to as the tension between hedonic and eudai-
monic approaches, and while some have attempted to reconcile these by suggesting 
that a life rich in both kinds of pursuits is associated with the greatest degree of 
wellbeing (e.g., Huta and Ryan 2010), the relationship between these two forms of 
happiness remains unclear, not least in terms of how they might actually interact in 
practice in a given social context. 
In this article, I suggest that Urarina manage two distinct but related concepts of 
happiness that loosely (though not entirely) map onto this division between hedo-
nism and eudaimonia. Both are ultimately social and relational ideals, attributes of 
groups rather than individuals, as it were, though one corresponds to short-term, 
momentary pleasure, and the other to a more enduring sense of a life well lived, 
rich with meaning and purpose, and centering on a quite distinctive and multi-
faceted concept of tranquility. I argue that they are not contradictory, but come 
into alignment in interesting ways; in particular, I suggest, the short-term concept 
resembles a total social fact, one which condenses the meaning of the long-term, 
more objective concept of living well, in all its complexity, into an enjoyable subjec-
tive experience. Central to both forms of happiness are a particular form of non-
alienated labor in which people are free to extend their capacities in satisfying ways, 
and a sense of harmony or correspondence between people’s attitudes, beliefs, and 
actions, one that endows them with a sense of individuality while contributing to a 
distinctive and intrinsically enjoyable “style of life.”
The virtues of tranquility 
The Urarina pursue a generally subsistence lifestyle of hunting, fishing, small-scale 
horticulture, and gathering wild forest fruits and other produce, interspersed with 
occasional bouts of extractive activity for passing fluvial traders under the system 
of habilitación¸ in which goods are advanced on credit in order to incite people 
to work. They mostly live in small, scattered settlements of around ten or twenty 
houses, each relatively autonomous both economically and politically. Although 
few Urarina today would readily be described as Christian, either by outsiders 
or by themselves, it is quite possible that Christianity—as imparted by Jesuit and 
Franciscan missionaries in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for instance—
has nevertheless shaped present-day moral values, as it may have done elsewhere in 
the region (see, e.g., Fausto 2007). Over the course of a couple of years spent living 
with them, I came to appreciate that Urarina people maintain a certain conviction 
that despite life’s many hardships and struggles, their own way of life is the best one 
possible. They are especially scornful of urban life, where “you can’t do anything 
unless you have money,” though they also disparage the ways of their indigenous 
neighbors, who, they admit, are stronger and richer, but also, they insist, morally 
inferior. Though they sometimes lament the fact that many of the neighboring 
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Candoshi have entered wage labor or become so-called “professionals,” few Urarina, 
when given the opportunity, were themselves willing to enter wage labor for more 
than a few days at a time, valuing their flexibility and freedom more than increased 
income or the ideal of “progress.” People would often remark that they want to, or 
should, “replace [their] forefathers”: that is, live their lives in broad accordance with 
the same general values and aspirations as previous generations. 
In seeking to characterize these values and aspirations, a good place to start 
is the ubiquitous Urarina term raotojoeein, which, as noted above, means loosely 
“being calm” or (as I prefer) “tranquility.” Its prevalence in everyday conversation 
would be difficult to overestimate: someone asked how a recent trip into the forest 
went, for example, or how a patient recovering from illness was faring, could well 
be expected to answer, simply, “tranquilly.” To begin with, it is clear that raotojoeein 
implies freedom from danger and distress. As such, we are immediately reminded 
of superficially similar ideas in ancient Greek and Buddhist philosophy, most no-
tably the concept of ataraxia, or tranquility, promoted as the goal of life, or telos, in 
both Pyrrhonism and Epicureanism (e.g., Warren 2002). Tranquility in this context 
may be glossed as freedom from disturbance, or absence of trouble, and for the 
Skeptics in particular arises from a suspension of judgment concerning the na-
ture or essence of things. Unlike the ancient Greek ataraxia, however, the Urarina 
ideal of tranquility should not be taken to imply an attitude of equanimity, mental 
composure, or emotional stability in the face of external fluctuations or adverse 
circumstances (e.g., Striker 1990). Nor does it equate to an absence of passion. For 
Urarina, as for perhaps most other native Amazonians, certain legitimate forms 
of violence, especially violent revenge against enemies, may be an important part 
of the good life, or at least may imbue life with a sense of purpose even as it dis-
rupts the hard-won state of tranquility. On the other hand, it is in many ways the 
perennial threat of violence, the sense that danger lurks around every corner, that 
renders its absence so valuable. As Peter Gow (2000) has observed, his initial sense 
that daily life among the Piro was rather boring gradually gave way to an apprecia-
tion of the fact that this apparent boredom was experienced not as a lack, but as a 
positive achievement—a goal, in fact, of social life. “Doing nothing” was not only 
essentially an invitation to sociality, it was also necessarily a state carved out against 
a background of inevitable suffering and helplessness, in a cosmos pervaded by the 
constant threat of violence in which myriad hostile agents, human and nonhuman, 
always threaten to disrupt the calm surface of life, bringing illness or misfortune, 
or worse. 
It is very common when among Urarina people to hear someone say, “noth-
ing happened” as a form of praise, to mean that everything went well. In Rosa’s 
account, with which this article began, she repeatedly emphasized that “nothing 
happened” to express her satisfaction with her husband and with married life in 
general. Yet this apparent lack of events certainly does not imply boredom. So far as 
I can tell, the Urarina have no term for boredom, and while it is perfectly possible 
that the experience of boredom is not unknown to them (especially in the city, as 
I discuss further below), I think they would be more likely to describe such a feel-
ing as a kind of “sadness,” arising from a temporary lack of people with whom to 
socialize. This indeed is what people would say—“it’s sad”—when large numbers 
of people left the village for a few days to extract timber for sale. When surrounded 
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by one’s kin, with ample opportunities for productive labor, it seems more or less 
impossible to be bored. 
Examining more closely the Urarina term for tranquility, raotojoeein, would 
seem to imply a much greater semantic density than obtains in its English equiva-
lent. The stem rao or rau is found in a number of possible cognates, all associated 
in one way or another with Urarina conceptions of the good. These include words 
for calm (raoti), peace (raotono), taste (raotono), right or law (rauhi), an honorable 
person (raunacaaena), to be straight (rauhicha), truth (rauhijidi), to make happy 
(rausiaaeca), to heal (rautaa), and to like or enjoy (rautatoha). There are echoes 
here of the Cofán ideal of opa, which Michael Cepek (2008) has suggested denotes 
the paradigmatic Cofán conception of the desirable. Opa is used equally to refer to 
a “satisfying” existence, a “happy” community, and a “good” person, while also (and 
perhaps above all) referring to a certain quality of collective calmness, and freedom 
from fear. In the words of one of Cepek’s informants: “Opatssi means living without 
being timid or nervous. It means that you’ll be happy” (ibid.: 341). In my case, the 
Urarina word raotoha, or “delicious”—which would seem to be part of the same se-
mantic matrix—was in fact the very first Urarina word I ever learned, quite simply 
because it was the first word my hosts took it upon themselves to teach me, imme-
diately after we shared our first meal. The singular importance of this moment will 
become clearer below, as we see precisely how the sociable enjoyment of food is in-
tegrated into the wider constellation of values that make life rich and worth living. 
Beyond the numerous semantic connections to morally worthy conditions and 
qualities, tranquility is associated with a range of other conditions necessary for 
living well, free of fear and stress, including good food and an abundance of game 
animals; good weather, especially sunshine, implying plenty of time remaining 
until the inevitable apocalypse; harmonious sociality, full of wit and good humor 
while avoiding heated emotions; and ample opportunities for the free and peaceful 
exercise of one’s skills in carrying out productive chores, especially tasks dedicated 
toward the satisfaction of the needs or desires of others, such that competence and 
concentrated exertion become an expression of control and self-mastery. Urarina 
conceptions of the good life are broader than any straightforward concept of happi-
ness would imply, and it is the former rather than the latter that they typically seem 
to strive for. Shamanic knowledge and power, for example, are extremely highly 
valued and widely sought after, but can only be obtained through stringent forms 
of discipline and self-denial, and often lead to a life full of suspicion and magical 
violence. There is a widespread sense in which “suffering” is seen as essential for 
obtaining certain benefits, including especially bodily skills or forms of knowledge 
(see also High 2010: 758). Ultimately, perhaps we should say that happiness ac-
quires meaning in relation to suffering, but that both may nevertheless figure as 
valued components of a more overarching conception of a purposeful life (see also 
the introduction to this collection). 
In a similar vein, it is also important to note that Urarina do not live tranquil 
lives all the time, free from anxiety and fear. On the contrary, their lives are all 
too often pervaded by hostility and envy, tension and resentment, and ongoing at-
tempts to ward off dangers from all sides. In some cases, tranquility is willfully dis-
rupted through the active pursuit of conflict or danger, the production of enmity, 
or engagement with a hostile exterior, which may also figure as an important and 
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socially productive dynamic of Amazonian life (see, e.g., Overing 1981; Viveiros de 
Castro 2001: 37–8). Tranquility is an ideal, a goal, achieved for periods of time, but 
never permanent, and it cannot be taken for granted. It is, importantly, not a natu-
ral state, but a collective achievement of people working well together: an immate-
rial product of people’s labor. It is conducive, in turn, to meaningful involvement 
in work and love, allowing these to come to the fore of daily experience, giving rise 
to lasting satisfaction and a sense of purpose. Achieving a state of tranquility opens 
up new horizons for action and is the condition of possibility of a life of meaning in 
which one is free to develop one’s capacities and to exercise virtues such as generos-
ity, self-control, and respect for others. 
The mastery of work 
In contemplating our own ideal working lives, leisure time often seems to emerge 
as a central preoccupation. In his classic paper on “the original affluent society,” 
Marshall Sahlins (1968) claimed that hunter-gatherer societies had achieved an 
easy form of material wellbeing because their needs were few and easily met by 
just a few hours of work per day. Descola (1996) and others have pursued similar 
arguments in an Amazonian context on the basis of meticulous measurements 
of time spent by both sexes in work as opposed to “leisure” activities. This kind 
of study arguably reflects a certain concern in the West with increasing leisure 
time—a laudable goal, by all means, but one that can regrettably come to substi-
tute for that of improving or transforming the work experience itself. It seems to 
me that Amazonians do not rigidly distinguish between work and free time, nor 
do they see leisure as the more enjoyable of the two. What better accounts for 
their “affluence,” if that is the right term, is the pleasure and satisfaction they find 
in their work, arising largely from the ways in which work itself is organized. As 
Overing has written apropos of the Venezuelan Piaroa, “The affluent community 
.  . . was the one that could take into account on a daily level both flexibility in 
schedules of work and individual preferences for the specific tasks themselves . . . 
affluence was a matter of achieving personal comfort in work, and not of produc-
tive accumulation” (1989: 166).
Many basic work activities, such as gardening or gathering wild forest produce, 
are carried out in pairs or small groups. As the composition of these groups dif-
fers according to the task, specific social relationships can be activated or nurtured 
through the choice of activity. Moreover, insofar as Amazonian sociality routinely 
stretches beyond humankind to implicate a range of nonhuman animals, plants, or 
spirits, successful engagement in many subsistence tasks can require management 
of these relationships in some form or another (e.g., through the performance of 
ritualized songs or chants). Given how interpersonal relationships are consistently 
singled out as the most important factor in subjective wellbeing, we should perhaps 
not underestimate the importance of engaging with the living landscape intersub-
jectively, rather than as objective resources awaiting exploitation (Miles-Watson 
2010). Such intersubjective relations with nonhumans are of course often highly 
unstable, and may be downright anxiety inducing, as noted above, further casting 
into relief the ideal of tranquility. When managed successfully, however, they may 
2015 | Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 5 (3): 177–196
Harry Walker 184
contribute to the sociability of productive life and perhaps even to that sense of 
immersion in a mesh of immanent mental processes that Gregory Bateson (1972) 
associates with the idea of grace. 
Another reason why people mostly enjoy their work seems to be that opportuni-
ties for action remain more or less equal to people’s capabilities, allowing them to 
become immersed in their tasks, exercising their skills in a concentrated but relaxing 
way. An activity such as extracting timber, for instance, contains within it a universe 
of technical operations—clearing, felling, cutting, rolling, tying, floating—each of 
which requires the mastery of a specific set of technical operations, thus offering 
considerable experiential diversity even within a “single” chore. This opportunity 
for the exercise of practical mastery is a key reason why the vast majority of Urarina 
find city life highly unsatisfactory, even downright frustrating. After one prolonged 
period of idleness in the city, during which time he had done little but sit around 
in the old church in Iquitos where all Urarina are welcome to stay for free as long 
as they please, one man said to me, “I just can’t stand it anymore here. I want to go 
back to my work. In the city you can’t be tranquil.” Though it is not always achieved, 
people strive for a kind of rhythm while they work, such that even hard labor—
sometimes described as “suffering”—can still ultimately be experienced as satisfy-
ing. “Working in the field, you really suffer . . . but we live well,” as one person put it. 
This merging of action and awareness within daily activities resembles what 
psychologists have described as the experience of flow: “People become so involved 
in what they are doing that the activity becomes spontaneous, almost automatic; 
they stop being aware of themselves as separate from the actions they are perform-
ing” (Csikszentmihályi 1992: 53). There is a sense of total concentration and focus, 
combined with relaxation and a sense of involvement or absorption in the task at 
hand. It is not the sense of being in control that people enjoy, but the sense of exer-
cising control in difficult situations (ibid.: 61). The freedom to act on the need to 
create opens up possibilities of self-realization, and directs desires toward external-
ization through creation rather than the acquisition of goods. As Hegel and Marx 
recognized, such creative work allows persons to know one another by external-
izing themselves in an existence oriented toward others. 
For this reason, I think, the prototype of “real work” is not wage labor. Thus when 
I once stopped briefly in an Urarina community and asked after the schoolteacher, 
who was a friend of mine, I was told simply, “He’s at his work.” My interlocutor 
clearly did not mean the school, which was deserted, despite it being a weekday. 
Instead, the implication was that he was out fishing or tending his garden, engaged 
in productive labor in order to meet the immediate needs of his loved ones. In en-
gaging in such work, people typically have a wide range of tasks from which they 
are free to choose at will, and this “pluriactivity” (Gasché and Vela Mendoza 2012) 
is central to one’s ability to live well. People do what they feel like doing on any par-
ticular day, do it with whom they wish to socialize, and (with the partial exception 
of schoolteachers) rarely engage in the same activity for more than a couple of days 
running—which is of course one reason why anything resembling long-term wage 
labor is steadfastly avoided by the majority. In Marxian terms, people manage to 
avoid any form of alienation from their labor or its products. 
Even short-term paid work is only temporarily attractive: when an oil company 
once began drilling in the area, for example, the company representative announced 
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that there was work available and that people should turn up at the site each morn-
ing, ready to go. For a short while, the company was inundated each day by a sea 
of willing workers. But the numbers very quickly dwindled to a small trickle, and 
their performance on the job grew increasingly erratic. One day, I overheard the 
company representative exclaim in frustration to a colleague, “I can’t go on! I just 
can’t work with these people!” In a similar vein, when Urarina today enter tempo-
rarily into apparently hierarchical relationships with labor bosses, or patrones, they 
manage to do so largely on their own terms and always for limited periods of time. 
Indeed, while the system of habilitación is sometimes seen as exploitative, both by 
Urarina and by other outside observers, its intermittent nature allows it to fit in well 
with the flexible and varied schedules that most people prefer. 
Individuality and style 
That there is something resembling a consensus among Urarina on the basic re-
quirements of living well should not be taken to imply a homogeneity of values, 
or that there is little or no significant individual variation in life choices or goals. 
For some people, the desire for continuity with the ancestors exists alongside (or is 
even superseded by) a parallel desire for “progress,” to “be civilized,” to move away 
from the ancestors to the extent that the latter lived in what by some standards 
now appears as a state of savagery, ignorance, and violence. Such people commonly 
extol the virtues of so-called “civilized” life in sedentary, orderly villages fashioned 
in accordance with the model of the Native Community set forth by the Peruvian 
government, complete with elected officials, a primary school, football field, com-
munal first aid kit, and the like. Maintaining a community of this sort requires 
ongoing “collaboration” from its inhabitants, in various ways, and this pressure can 
give rise to tensions, usually when those desiring progress seek to impose their vi-
sion on others by inducing them to contribute to common community projects.
On the whole, however, differences in values do not give rise to conflicts, be-
cause of the pervasive emphasis on individual autonomy. People would rarely if 
ever dream of telling someone else what to do. Hence the general refusal to “read” 
or appear to know what is going on in the mind of another—an insistence on men-
tal opacity that appears to reflect people’s sensitivity to impinging on others’ self-
determination (see Stasch 2008). The Urarina are not moralists who seek to im-
pose a single view on all, and within the context of an overarching emphasis on 
tranquility, they recognize that good lives may take many different forms—at least 
up to a point—because lives are made good by the possession of many different 
goods. These can be combined in many different ways, and perhaps even ranked 
in different orders of importance, depending on people’s character and their social 
context, but because these can differ greatly, there cannot be a single blueprint of 
how one should live. It is perhaps less a matter of what is done than how something 
is done that leads to enjoyment in life: what Irving Goldman (1963), writing of the 
Amazonian Cubeo, has referred to as their “style of life.” According to Goldman, 
each social relationship for the Cubeo demanded a specific atmosphere of feel-
ings, sentiments, and emotions: “Nothing of consequence can result from an act 
divorced from its proper mood” (ibid.: 253). Manufacture itself was a pleasurable 
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recreation, and when the exertion of some particularly strenuous task—such as 
housebuilding—broke “the spell of good feeling,” it was exchanged for another 
(ibid.: 66). Economic expansion or material advantage was of far less interest than 
emotional comfort or ease and personal autonomy. In the successful creation of a 
Cubeo community, Goldman suggested, its members had achieved a “spontaneity 
of correspondence between emotion and action” (ibid.: 285, see also Overing 1989).
The concept of a style of life is useful in describing how people derive enjoy-
ment. Though the concept of style is most commonly understood as an aesthetic 
judgment, it can be used to characterize the moral aspect of some lives, as emerges 
from distinctive ways of acting. As the philosopher John Kekes points out, a good 
life is made enjoyable by pleasure derived from certain kinds of activities: from “ac-
tions done in the right way, from our rightful being, from the possession of a man-
ner that confers merit, and from being the right manner of man. The enjoyments 
these ingredients of a good life provide are the result of one’s style of life, from 
how something is done, not what is done” (2008: 22). Styles of life reflect one’s at-
titude to life in general and to one’s own life in particular. Even though the Urarina 
may easily appear to an outside observer to be quite homogeneous in many ways, 
with relatively little variation in beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors, there is in fact—as 
everywhere—considerable scope for individual variation in attitudes and values, 
within the broader spectrum of possibilities recognized as valuable or legitimate 
in a particular cultural context. Some men I knew, for example, would seek out 
a quiet, modest existence at some distance from other households, characterized 
by heightened levels of self-sufficiency and relatively free of material possessions; 
others would thrive on being at the center of social and political life in the most 
densely populated villages. Such life choices are equally good, and seen as such, 
provided that they accurately reflect what people most deeply care about, and that 
those leading such lives are in control, rather than at the mercy of necessity and 
contingency. If so, they exhibit a form of mastery of life that is both virtuous and 
inherently enjoyable. 
Not all Urarina, it should be said, enjoy the privilege of a successful or enjoy-
able style of life. For example, one man I knew was virtually obsessed with his own 
political career, and with winning the countless minor feuds in which he constantly 
found himself embroiled wherever he went. He pursued victory by seeking to ex-
pand his power and influence, and for a while was convinced this would come with 
greater official (governmental) recognition as a citizen and legitimate authority in 
the community. Yet he was continually frustrated in these endeavors by his inabil-
ity to negotiate the complex bureaucracy required by the Peruvian state to obtain 
even the simplest form of identity documents, such as a birth certificate. He did 
not seem to particularly enjoy his existence, on the whole, because his style of life 
comprised attitudes that were in some sense unrealistic, together with patterns of 
action that were not particularly successful, with the result that he was unable to 
live on his own terms. As another of my collaborators once expressed it: “Wherever 
he goes, he just can’t live tranquilly.” 
Styles of life make corresponding actions characteristically and identifiably the 
actions of particular individuals. People do what they do cheerfully, confidently, 
wholeheartedly, and so on; as Kekes (2008) puts it, it is as if their characteristic ac-
tions bear their personal stamp. Independence; wit and good humor; exuberance 
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and wholeheartedness; the pursuit of knowledge; creativity; political achievement; 
compassion for others: all these and more may feature more or less prominently 
in Urarina people’s attitudes to life, informing their sensibilities, motivating their 
most important activities, eliciting their deepest emotions, providing a standard 
of judgment for evaluating what is good or bad and better or worse in their lives. 
To the extent that people’s attitudes, beliefs, and emotions are consistent with each 
other, and consistently reflected in their actions, no matter what those actions may 
be, they have a style of life that reduces the extent to which they are at the mercy 
of necessity or contingency, and thus allows for an enjoyable feeling of control or 
mastery, similar to that derived from valued forms of labor. 
Free from fear and anxiety, in good health, people are thus encouraged to pursue 
their own conception of the good in their own way. This is a central component of 
Amazonian individualism, where self-determination is highly valued, but remains 
resolutely social at the same time, and, far from coming into conflict with the needs 
of a wider social group, often directly supports them. If the mastery of work allows 
for a feeling of autonomy and control, the practice of these techniques is neverthe-
less always aimed at satisfying the needs and desires of others, at improving their 
wellbeing. Thus, men master the art of hunting so that their wives and children 
can eat meat; women master the art of weaving so that their husbands and children 
can sleep well at night; and so on. Total self-sufficiency is never the aim; instead, 
balancing autonomy and desirable forms of dependency is always a central concern 
and a source of deep satisfaction. 
Tranquility (raotojoeein), then, as an enduring (though not permanent) attri-
bute of a group of intimates, usually close kin, would seem to be the outcome or 
product of certain kinds of action in the world, or work conducted in the right kind 
of way. As an achieved state of being that enriches lives and makes them valuable, it 
might usefully be construed in terms of Urarina conceptions of the common good. 
As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2009) point out, the notion of the commons 
refers to such environmental resources as land and water, but equally (and, in the 
modern West, increasingly) to the results of human labor and creativity, in the 
form of ideas, languages, knowledge, codes, affects, and so on. Refusing any rigid 
distinction between the “natural” and “artificial” commons, these authors argue 
that under what they term biopolitical production, what is ultimately produced 
is not simply objects for subjects, but subjects for objects, or forms of subjectivity 
itself: the object of production, in other words, is a subject defined by a social re-
lationship or a form of life. Tranquility, I suggest, might be considered as precisely 
such a form of life. Such a construal does not imply homogeneity, nor is it at odds 
with the emphasis on individuality as revealed through a style of life. As Hardt and 
Negri make clear, far from negating difference, the common brings with it an af-
firmation of singularities. 
The returned hunter 
I now want to turn from these long-term senses of tranquility, as part of the com-
mons and an aspect of people’s lives as a whole, to a more short-term sense of “feel-
ing good.” To refer to this latter state, Urarina may use the expression rachojoiha, 
2015 | Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 5 (3): 177–196
Harry Walker 188
“to be happy,” which can refer to any scenario of momentary joy: As one man told 
me once: “When my son Jorge was born, I was so happy (rachojoiano). Before that I 
only had daughters. But you know, sometimes fathers want to have sons, to accom-
pany them and help them with their work. And son-in-law isn’t the same.” Another 
man said: “I’m happy when my family arrives, when my son comes to visit, and 
sleep in the house, and stays here a while.” Other moments of joy would include 
the baptism of a child, or drunken dancing at a party (or, better still, both at once: 
“Baptizing a child makes people dance with enthusiasm!”). We may note that such 
moments, pregnant with possibility, imply a state of arousal or excitement, and are 
also best shared with others, or held in common, in which the positive affect is not 
easily reducible to individual experience. Yet when I began asking a range of differ-
ent people to give me an example of a time in their own lives when they felt “happy,” 
I was curious to find that many independently offered, by way of example, the mo-
ment of seeing someone returning to the community having just slain a large game 
animal, knowing that they would soon all eat together. In fact, for many people, this 
apparently straightforward scenario seemed to epitomize or exemplify the Urarina 
conception of happiness. As such, I wish to spend a moment exploring it further, 
elucidating its components. 
To begin with, it is noteworthy that the experience singled out as happy is not 
the straightforward gratification of the senses through the process of eating, or 
even the sight of one’s children taking pleasure in this way. It is instead an anticipa-
tion of that moment, while it still exists in the future as something to look forward 
to. The reasons for this, I think, will soon become apparent. Secondly, given the 
enjoyment that comes from practical mastery in general and from hunting in par-
ticular, it is of interest that no one, not even men who were accomplished hunters, 
gave as an example of happiness their own returning to the village with an animal. 
There can be no doubt that hunting is considered great fun, and I have seen little 
among Urarina to compare with the adrenalin and excitement that comes from 
spotting and pursuing potential prey. Similarly, though they always make efforts 
to appear low key and implacable, and would never dream of boasting, returning 
hunters must feel a real surge of pride at their success and the happiness they bring 
to others. But active excitement, the rush of blood and the frenzy of pursuit—like 
immediate sensory gratification—did not seem to encapsulate real happiness as 
well or as fully as the more passive but morally loaded state of anticipation of a 
pleasurable moment shared with others in which need is alleviated. 
The importance of food—or, more specifically, the importance of satisfying 
people’s desires for food—has been demonstrated by Gow (1991) to be central to 
the functioning of the subsistence economy. Piro people find the sight of a child 
eating earth, and thus satisfying its own desires, to be intensely disturbing. Yet 
there is a broader context to the scene of the returned hunter, in the sense that 
Urarina believe that game animals were placed on the earth by the divine Creator 
(Cana Coaaunera), for their nourishment. Animals are divine gifts that manifest 
the Creator’s concern for humankind, and His pity for those in His care: proof of 
His active, caring presence. While a scarcity of game is a sign that all is not well—
that humans have been forsaken or the apocalypse is near—finding and killing an 
animal conversely implies that the Creator is looking kindly upon His children, 
who live “under His watchful eye” (notaracae), as people sometimes put it. At these 
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times, not only those humans who will eat feel happy: I often heard it said that 
pet birds, for example, know in advance when a hunter will return to the village, 
knowledge they communicate to their human owners by “dancing” and “jumping 
for joy,” throwing dry grass up into the air. 
Yet to overemphasize the cosmological dimensions of this moment would risk 
obscuring its phenomenological aspects, the importance of which become clear 
when one has lived in this way for a period of time and experienced first-hand 
this very moment. One of the greatest difficulties I faced in adjusting to life in the 
jungle was adapting to the highly erratic food supply. I generally made an effort to 
eat as and when others did, and this often meant long periods of time, sometimes a 
day or more, subsisting on little more than warm banana drink, which, as Urarina 
say, “deceives the stomach” but never really satiates. Hunger for meat would begin 
to dominate my thoughts, even as my belly was kept full by watery banana, and I 
began to devote more and more time to thinking about my next meal and where it 
might come from. I suspect others were often in a similar situation, which is why 
a hunter would usually set out into the forest on the stated grounds that his wife 
or children were desperate to eat meat. It is in this context, too, that we must place 
the sight of his successful return, animal in hand: an immediate relief from anxiety 
about the food supply, and an anticipated relief from hunger. This sense of relief 
brings with it a feeling of lightness, an easing of burdens, and a sense that one is 
being taken care of, looked after. In such moments, life is truly good. 
It is worth spending some time on what happens next, for while sharing food 
has very often been discussed by anthropologists from a conceptual standpoint in 
terms of the creation of kinship through shared bodily substance, very few have 
explored it from the point of view of what it actually feels like for one doing the 
eating. In Amazonia at least, this has arguably led to an excessive focus on consub-
stantiality and the body at the expense of the emotional and affective dimensions 
of sharing a meal. The returned hunter is not a guaranteed positive experience, and 
can sometimes evoke anxiety as it is not always certain that one will be invited to 
eat or given a share. Being denied an invitation can easily cause offense, though, 
which is why the hunter and his family will usually be quite discreet, and as secre-
tive as possible, if they are not planning on sharing with everyone in the vicinity. 
For this reason, perhaps, the truly happy sight is of an animal sufficiently large, say 
a peccary or tapir, that one can be sure of not being overlooked, avoiding the added 
discomfort and indignity of growing still hungrier while others eat. 
Hospitality and generosity are central to what comes next. The animal as a 
whole is a gift from the Creator, but as meat, raw or cooked, it takes the form of 
gifts from the hunter and his wife to neighbors and loved ones. Sometimes cuts of 
raw meat are given, but more commonly a large, thick soup (corerajaa) is made, 
from which everyone shares. The men of the village come together to eat at the 
house of the hunter, whose wife sends their children with portions for neighboring 
wives and children who stay in their homes. People eat only what they have been 
offered to eat, such that food sharing forms part of a hospitable exchange that will 
be reciprocated in the future. Hence the distinction between human eating (lenon-
iha) and animal feeding (quiha), which so many languages seem to make. Eating 
a meal together in the human style is an inherently humanizing activity, much as 
eating foods such as game animals designated for humans is at the heart of what 
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distinguishes humans from other kinds of being—hence, for example, mythical ac-
counts of transformation into animal form often describe the foods eaten (berries, 
leaves, grass) as the hallmarks of nonhuman existence.1 
The moment of eating itself involves the stimulation and satisfaction of all the 
senses. Usually no condiments or flavorings are used other than salt, with the re-
sult that the flavor of the meat itself is very important. There is all the difference 
in the world between different species of animal, but while many people have their 
favorites, they would not mention this while eating, as this could seem ungrateful. 
Similarly, children always eat what they are given, without complaint; any hint of 
refusing food is met with extreme scorn. Eating is relaxing, an excuse to take a 
break from what one might have been doing, and sometimes to withdraw in a way, 
though eating is also, and perhaps more commonly, an excuse to enter into social-
ity. Women typically eat with their children, while men especially eat with other 
men, using this as an opportunity to sit together and talk, and this liminal phase 
approaches what Turner (1969) would have called “communitas.” At the conclusion 
of a meal, a few words are said by the host to each guest in turn, and a short speech 
is made of thanksgiving to the Creator. 
A good meal is prepared such that everyone eats his or her fill and is left with 
the slight heaviness that comes of a full belly, associated with a real sense of satia-
tion and a readiness to relax. Eating well thus makes it easier to achieve a state of 
tranquility. Yet if we examine this feeling of satisfaction more closely, or more spe-
cifically our experience of moving past satisfaction from one activity to another, 
it becomes apparent that this is more than simply a moment of closure or fulfill-
ment. One never becomes specifically aware of moving past fullness to emptiness, 
or from absence to presence. As phenomenologists have pointed out, the feeling 
of satisfaction does not mean an absolute limit has been reached, so much as that 
a new horizon has opened to us: we reach the threshold of one particular engage-
ment with the world and enter into another (Jager 1999). We notice a shift in our 
attention, a turn in our interest, and the opening up of a new path that invites our 
exploration. In other words, “to be satisfied” means to give in to a new adventure 
and to approach the world from a different angle. There is a strong sense of flow 
here, in other words, such that the moment of joy is anything but cut off from the 
rhythms of social life which encompass it, as anticipation gives way to satiety while 
opening up new horizons of activity. 
The returning hunter thus precipitates a cycle of desire and satisfaction, in 
which the shared quality of the experience is crucial. Rather like enjoying a great 
view, there is a sense of shame or loss if one cannot share the experience with an-
other, and shared experience is often, I suspect, more highly valued than individual 
experience. It is not a static moment, and does not simply end in satiety. While it 
certainly alleviates the anxieties that surround an uncertain food supply, thus pav-
ing the way for a state of tranquility, it also leads to an opening up of horizons, of 
new possibilities, in a continuous dynamic movement that orients daily life. The 
returned hunter might indeed be considered an example of what Mauss ([1925] 
2002) termed a “total social fact,” a unifying event or a symbol of core social values 
1. In Urarina, it is possible to say that humans “feed” (quiha), just as it is in English, but it 
sounds odd or amusing.
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that integrates all aspects of Urarina life, economic, moral, religious, and aesthetic; 
at once eminently sensory, social, and cosmological. It brings together the values 
and practices that, taken together, comprise the Urarina vision of the good life, and 
condenses these into a short-lived but multifaceted and dynamic subjective experi-
ence that lies at the heart of their conception of happiness. 
Conclusion 
A distinction between short-term, affective or hedonic conceptions of happiness 
that emphasize satisfaction or “feeling good,” and long-term, objective or eudaimon-
ic conceptions of happiness that stress self-actualization, a life of virtue, and a wider 
sense of “flourishing,” has pervaded Western thinking on the subject for millennia. 
While there is a growing sense that focusing on one of these contrastive aspects of 
happiness to the exclusion of the other is problematic, and that integrating them is 
necessary (e.g., Tomer 2011), exactly how they do or should inform people’s life goals 
and motivations in differing cultural contexts remains unclear, as does the nature of 
the relationship between them. How does momentary pleasure, in short, involving 
enjoyable and positive experiences, relate to active involvement or engagement in life 
and all that it requires, and to having a higher purpose, a meaningful life? In seeking 
to answer this question for the Peruvian Urarina, I have shown how they manage 
two interrelated concepts of happiness, one of which is long term and is epitomised 
by a state of “tranquility”; the other of which is short term and is epitomized by the 
joyous sight of the successful hunter returned from the forest. These are not opposed 
concepts; in fact they imply each other in several ways. Interestingly, some similar 
distinctions appear to be made by at least some other Amazonian peoples: one is re-
minded of the distinction Piro people make between “having a good time, having a 
festival” and “living well, living quietly” (Gow 2000); as well as the contrast drawn by 
the Trio between onken, the condition of everyday contentment that implies calm-
ness and quiet, and sasame, a more climactic state of ritual happiness, exemplified by 
joyous, collective dancing (Rivière 2000: 257). According to Peter Rivière, the latter 
might be understood as a kind of “aesthetic intensification” of the former.2 
The Urarina concept of “tranquility” (raotojoeein) is central to their sense of a 
life well lived, and perhaps even more than short-term pleasure is a goal or ideal for 
which they actively strive. It must be understood, in the first instance, in relation to 
the uncertainty, danger, and violence that provide the backdrop of everyday social-
ity. In some ways, it recalls certain other, better-known concepts of happiness as 
tranquility, such as the ancient Greek concept of ataraxia, which is often described 
as a lucid state of robust tranquility, characterized by ongoing freedom from dis-
tress and worry. According to Epicurus, one reaches the pleasant state of tranquility 
by realizing that there are only a handful of desires that must be fulfilled in order 
to lead a pleasant life, and that those can easily be satisfied. Epicurean tranquility is 
“a state of contentment and inner calm that arises from the thought that one has or 
2. According to Rivière, sasame means “happy” in its simplest sense, but also has a deeper 
meaning that “implies a sense of inner contentment and the feeling of belonging not 
only to society but to the whole of nature and the universe” (ibid.: 254).
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can easily get all that one needs, and has no reason to be afraid of anything in the 
future” (Striker 1990: 100).3 
The Urarina sense of tranquility differs significantly from this emphasis on im-
perturbability, and from the Stoics’ indifference to everything bodily or external, 
and consequent freedom from emotion (apatheia). For Urarina, tranquility is more 
an external condition, one that necessarily involves others, and it implies emotional 
engagement and spontaneity. It is the grounds from which an enjoyable but also 
virtuous life becomes possible, a collective resource, part of the immaterial com-
mons. A state in which, to a casual outside observer, little seems to happen, it can 
easily seem rather boring, even if this boredom is recognized to be a purposive 
achievement, a space of calm carved out within a hostile cosmos pervaded by dan-
ger. Yet a quiet, calm but profound sense of enjoyment may be derived from going 
about one’s tasks in the right kind of way, in accordance with one’s attitudes to life, 
and I would suggest that the boredom of the anthropologist is directly proportional 
to his or her lack of practical mastery, a failure to develop the skills required to 
achieve small but meaningful goals from the materials at hand, and an inability 
to recognize opportunities for action and interaction. The only time I ever heard 
Urarina describe themselves as “bored” was when they were in the city, a place 
with few meaningful opportunities for the exercise of skill, and little if any available 
work that allows people to express their freedom and creativity. Work in the city 
for them was a drudgery, involving specialized routine tasks performed day in, day 
out, ad infinitum. Boredom, in short, is possible only in the absence of tranquility. 
In their preferred forest environment, by contrast, work is freely chosen, flexible, 
and diverse. A happy, tranquil life is the result of creative activity developing in mul-
tiple directions, and where economic production just one form among others. Activ-
ity is not merely a means adapted to certain ends; it is an end in itself. People literally 
“do one thing today and another tomorrow,” to invoke Marx and Engels’ well-known 
(if half-joking) description of a nonalienated society, in which one might “hunt in 
the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner 
. . . without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic.” ([1845–6] 1970: 
53)4 Through their work, which ideally becomes a free expression of their life, peo-
ple affirm themselves as well as those nearby who use or enjoy what they produce, 
whose needs they satisfy, and who in turn complete and confirm the worker in their 
thoughts and love. This kind of work is thus inherently communal, even when per-
formed alone. The flexibility and nonalienated character of work encourage people 
3. For Pyrrho and his followers in particular, tranquility was also closely linked to suspen-
sion of judgment concerning the true nature or essence of things. The things of the world 
are ultimately unfathomable and unknowable, and refusing to trust in our senses or judg-
ments, especially as concerns goods and evils, is the best way to avoid anxiety and achieve 
peace of mind (Striker 1990: 102–4) . It is tempting to speculate whether the “highly 
transformational world” of native Amazonians, in which, as Rivière put it, “it is never 
entirely safe to believe the evidence of your own eyes” (1994: 261), might similarly be an 
attitude of skepticism, though it scarcely in this case seems conducive to tranquility.
4. Alternatively, as Marx expressed the idea in an unpublished notebook: “The very activ-
ity of his work would enable him to enjoy his personality and realise his natural capac-
ity and spiritual aims” (cited in McLellan 1969: 464). 
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to focus on the activity at hand, allowing themselves to be absorbed into or lost in the 
interaction. This experience of flow is valuable precisely because of the way it steers a 
middle course between boredom and anxiety. Challenges are perceived not as threats, 
but as opportunities for action; put differently, goals and challenges imply each other, 
allowing people to achieve a feeling of control. Getting to this point requires disci-
pline and determination, and does not come naturally. Over and above the material 
goods that are perhaps the most obvious outcome, such work is also directly respon-
sible for the production of those immaterial commons—affects, social relationships, 
forms of life—that are conveniently captured in the notion of tranquility. 
The condition of tranquility allows people to act consistently and in accordance 
with their attitudes to life, their beliefs and emotions forming a harmonious whole. 
This means acting for others as much as for oneself, contributing to their wellbe-
ing, exercising the virtues of hard work and generosity. Practical mastery in work is 
inextricably linked to fostering relatedness with others. In fact, these are mutually 
reinforcing: people work to meet the needs of their loved ones, but are loved in 
turn, respected by their spouse and family, because they work hard. Hence Rosa’s 
account of her marriage to Lucho: “I’m happy with my husband because he works 
well. . . . Because of this, nothing ever happens.” In its ideal, the entirety of life is 
transformed into a kind of single activity with unified goals that provide a constant 
sense of purpose. When thoughts, feelings, and actions are congruent with one 
another, when boredom and anxiety are absent, people find in themselves an ad-
mirable strength and serenity. 
Within this broader state of tranquility (raotojoeein) arise fleeting moments of 
joy (rachojoiha), epitomized by the scene of the returned hunter. At first glance, 
the difference between joy and tranquility appears to correspond to a difference 
between subjective and objective conceptions of happiness, or between the positive 
affective state of feeling good and the objective conditions of the good life, which 
include scope for self-actualization and the practice of virtue. Yet I have argued in-
stead that the difference lies more in the fact that the momentary experience of joy, 
in its purest form, is a crystallization and intensification of all the ingredients that 
make up the good life, allowing for a harmony between sensory pleasure or gratifi-
cation, and moral, virtuous living with and through others. Pleasure is effectively a 
measure for judging moral goodness, as delight is taken in actions perceived to be 
worthy. This does not mean that tranquility can be reduced to joy, or vice versa, nor 
does it mean that there can be a single standard of hedonic value through which all 
forms of the good may be evaluated. It points instead to a different kind of achieve-
ment: the ability to find enjoyment in those fleeting moments in life that integrate 
one’s convictions of the good. 
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Un bonheur tranquille: des styles de bonheur des Urarinas Amazoniens
Résumé : Le plaisir pris dans la vie des urarinas amazoniens est envisagé à travers 
deux exemples contrastés du concept de bonheur. Le premier, la tranquilité, est 
envisagé au long-terme, il s’agit d’un état relationnel permettant une spontanéité 
émotionnelle et une routine de travail choisie librement, favorisant une symbiose 
de l’action de de la conscience du monde. Il représente un souci plus général pour 
le développement d’un “style de vie” individuel où les attitudes, les manières et les 
actes sont alignés. Le second concept, la joie est un état passager d’excitation et 
d’anticipation, typiquement incarné par le projet de partager un repas. Si  les deux 
concepts présupposent une séparation des domaines sensuel et moral, des plaisirs 
et de la vie bonne - qui se rapproche de la distinction classique entre hedonia et 
eudaimonia - les urarinas conçoivent l’experience de la joie dans sa forme la plus 
pure comme une cristallisation et une intensification de diverses composantes de 
la tranquillité, résolvant ainsi cette tension en créant la possibilité d’une harmonie 
entre plaisir sensuel et vie vertueuse. 
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